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Abstract 
Issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality are widespread in the economic 
literature. They have been increasingly raised in specific contexts within the 
class of LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games in the last 20 years, notably with 
reference to monetary policy. The more general conditions ensuring non-
neutrality in a strategic environment remain however to be inquired. We fill 
this gap by applying the classical theory of economic policy to a strategic 
context. This is also useful to highlight some existence conditions for policy 
game solutions. We restrict ourselves to the common LQ-games in a static 
perfect information framework, but our simple logic can be extended to 
other more general situations.   
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Issues of policy effectiveness were first analyzed in formal terms by 
Tinbergen (1952, 1956). He also asserted the need for policymakers to have 
recourse to second-best solutions – by maximizing the value of their 
preference function subject to the model representing the economy – in the 
case of a non-perfectly controllable system, an approach later developed by 
Theil (see Theil, 1964).
1 More general conditions for controllability both in 
a static and dynamic context were then stated (see Preston and Pagan, 1982; 
Hughes Hallett and Rees, 1983). 
Tinbergen, Theil, and the other founding fathers of economic policy were 
not concerned with analyzing the effectiveness of specific instruments. 
However, in the framework of the classical theory of economic 
policymaking it is not difficult to find the counterpart of the concepts of 
policy ineffectiveness and neutrality raised in the economic literature with 
reference to e.g. monetary policy or fiscal policy.
2 
The classical theory of economic policy has been the object of fierce 
criticism from a number of points of view. The introduction of rational 
expectations led to an assertion of ineffectiveness of monetary policy more 
forceful than that stated by Friedman (1968) (see Sargent and Wallace, 
1975). In a similar way, with rational expectations fiscal policy was 
considered to be ineffective on income. A proposition of policy neutrality or 
“invariance” was then stated. Apart from the critiques advanced with 
reference to the effectiveness of specific instruments, Lucas (1976) raised 
                                                           
1 A good account of the early contributions to the theory of economic policy is in Hughes 
Hallett (1989). 
2 See Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989).   3
the more general and forceful argument according to which a Tinbergen-
type decision model is inconsistent with the assumption of rational 
expectations.  
In more recent years, following Barro and Gordon (1983),
3 a new approach 
to the analysis of economic policy has been developed, that of policy games. 
Within this approach the issues of effectiveness of specific policy 
instruments have been raised again, mainly with reference to monetary 
policy, starting from the pioneering article of Gylfason and Lindbeck 
(1994).
4 Formal conditions leading to monetary policy ineffectiveness – or 
neutrality – have been explicitly or implicitly investigated in specific setups 
within the class of LQ-games. Such conditions are apparently very different 
from those stated in the classical analysis of economic policy: the latter are 
expressed in terms of matrix ranks, whereas the former have to do with the 
nature of players’ preferences and the strategic interaction.
5 
By applying the classic theory of economic policy to a strategic context, we 
find general conditions for non-neutrality and highlight some existence 
conditions for policy games (Nash/Stackelberg) equilibrium. We also check 
our conditions with references to the effectiveness of monetary policy 
                                                           
3 Barro and Gordon (1983) deliver the well-known prediction of monetary neutrality as a 
result of the private-sector expectations of the monetary policy. The private sector forms 
rational expectations of the money supply and acts to fully crowd-out the effects of 
monetary action on the real output by adjusting nominal wages. A socially inefficient 
inflation bias ensues. Barro-Gordon’s analysis can be – and usually is (see, among others, 
Stokey, 1990, and Sargent, 2002: Chapter 3) – expressed in terms of a Stackelberg game 
between the central bank and the private sector when the private sector strategies are 
explicitly modeled. 
4 See, among others, Acocella and Ciccarone (1997), Grűner and Hefeker (1999), Guzzo 
and Velasco (1999), Lawler (2000 and 2001), Soskice and Iversen (2000), Coricelli et al. 
(2000, 2001), Cukierman and Lippi (2001), Jerger (2002), Acocella and Di Bartolomeo 
(2004), Lippi (2003).    4
already found in the literature. The main advantage of our approach is that 
existence and ineffectiveness can be easily verified a priori by applying a 
simple counting rule, without solving the game. We restrict ourselves to the 
case of perfect information since it is well known that asymmetric 
information is itself a source of non-neutrality. However our simple logic 
can be extended to more complex frameworks. Some intuitions in that 
direction are provided in the last section.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is 
pedagogical and mainly needed to introduce a clear terminology and 
definitions.
6 It broadly describes the traditional Tinbergen-Theil’s approach 
(TTA, henceforth) to economic policy in terms of strictly quadratic 
preferences and a linear model. Section 3 presents our generalization of the 
TTA to a strategic context, by considering policy games with strictly 
quadratic preferences, and states the conditions for policy neutrality. This 
generalization is fully consistent with Lucas criticism since it considers the 
“private” sector’s action as endogenous. Section 4 provides some further 
generalizations to the case of linear-quadratic preferences. Section 5 checks 
that the conditions for the effectiveness of monetary policy found in the 
literature respect those stated in the previous section of the paper. Section 6 
concludes and provides some intuitions for further generalizations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
5 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004). 
6 Indeed, throughout the paper, a particular emphasis is placed on definitions and 
terminology used, since in literature no unanimous consensus on wording exists.   5
2. The Tinbergen-Theil approach
7 
2.1 The Tinbergen-Theil approach 
In this section we consider the optimization problem of a single decision-
maker (from now on, without loss of generality, the Government). We 
assume that the Government aims to achieve certain given targets
8 and, if 
this is not possible, to minimize deviations from them according to a 
quadratic function. Approaching the problem in this way has the advantage 
to merge together the fixed and flexible target approach making the former a 
particular case of the latter (see Preston and Pagan, 1982). It implies that we 
implicitly assume that, if the fixed target approach fails, the Government 
sets the instruments according to a flexible approach. Although the flexible 
approach is not the only alternative to the fixed one, flexible targets seem to 
be the alternative more in line with our attempt at reformulating the classical 
theory of economic policy with reference to a strategic context. 
The economic relationships between variables are defined by the following 
general linear algebraic system: 
(1)  yz ΑΒΚ =+    
where  Α  and Β are coefficient matrices,  y   and  z   are the vectors of 
possible target and instrument variables, Κ  is a vector of linear combination 
of other variables and/or white noise shocks, which the Government takes as 
                                                           
7 Throughout the paper we use the following notation. All vectors are real column vector 
defined by their dimension; all matrices are real matrices defined by their two dimensions. 
Considering two vectors, a and b, (a, b) is a column vector; considering matrices A and B 
with the same number of rows, [A : B] is a matrix formed by merging the two matrices. Ai,j 
is the i,j-element of matrix A, ai is the i-entry of vector a. 
8 We will later relax the assumption of a given target by considering also the possibility of 
non-satiation.   6
given.
9 Indeed, for the sake of exposition, the order of variables is not 
random as we will later see (see also Appendix A). 
First and foremost, in order to consider the Government’s problem in the 
TTA context, we limit our attention to the following linear algebraic sub-
system of equation (1):
10  
(2)  AyB uK =+  
where 
m y∈\  is the vector of  the relevant economic variables 
(Government’s target variables), 
n u∈\  is the vector of the Government’s 
policy instruments, 
mm A
× ∈\  and 
mn B
× ∈\  are parameter matrices (i.e. the 
target and instrument coefficient matrices), and 
m K ∈\  is a vector of 
constants, i.e. each component is a linear combination of exogenous 
constants and/or white noise shocks. We assume that  [ ] rank A m =  and 
[ ] { } min , rank B m n = . The full-rank assumptions imply both that all the 
targets and instrument variables are linearly independent (independence 
assumption).
11 Intuitively there are m distinct targets and n distinct 
instruments set by the Government. 
The linear reduced-form model can be written in matrix form as: 
(3) 
11 yA B uA KC u C
−− =+ = +   
                                                           
9 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper the stochastic structure is not explicitly considered 
and the certainty equivalence principle is advocated as we will consider LQ-problems only. 
Of course, the generalization cannot be advocated for other kinds of uncertainty such as the 
multiplicative one, incomplete or asymmetric information. 
10 The relationship between the two equation systems is explained in Appendix A. In this 
section this relationship is not very relevant since there is only one policymaker who acts in 
a parametric context. Later on it will become significant.  
11 Full-rank assumption is always assured by an appropriate manipulation of the original 
system (1), i.e. by removing linearly dependent redundant target and instrumental variables.   7
provided  A is non-singular from our rank assumptions.  
At this stage it is useful to define Government’s policy neutrality by using 
the reduced form (3). We start by introducing the concept of effectiveness 
and then we use this concept to define neutrality.  
Definition 1 (effectiveness): An instrument is effective with respect to a 
target variable if changes in the instrument determine changes in the 
equilibrium value of that target; otherwise it is ineffective.  
Definition 2 (exogenous policy neutrality): Economic policy is neutral with 
respect to a target variable, if all the instruments are ineffective with respect 
to that target variable.  
In the present case each zero in matrix C  implies the ineffectiveness of one 
instrument with respect to one target. Specifically, element  , 0 ij C =  implies 
that the j-instrument is ineffective with respect to i-target.  Neutrality with 
respect to i-target emerges if the row entries of matrix 
1 mn CA B
− × =∈ \  are 
all zeros. Our rank assumptions rule neutrality.
12 
The aim of the Government is to control the economic system (2), i.e. to 
determine the values of the target variables. More formally we can define 
controllability as follows.
13  
                                                           
12 It is trivial that when only one instrument is available effectiveness corresponds to non-
neutrality and neutrality corresponds to ineffectiveness. However, in multi-instrument cases 
this is not in general true.     
13 In this paper we consider only non-differential games (both static and dynamic in the 
sense of the players’ timing). Thus the controllability considered here is the so-called static 
controllability. In principle, all our results can be easily extended to the differential 
approach as for the traditional case (e.g. Preston and Pagan 1982: Chapters 1-3), but the 
differential policy games involve many technical difficulties that are outside the scope of 
this paper (for a discussion, see, Petit, 1990: Chapters 8-9).   8
Definition 3 (controllability): A system is controllable if the Government 
can determine the values of the target variables for any possible vector of 
desired targets by choosing an appropriate policy (i.e. vector of 
instruments).  
Controllability can be also defined in weak terms: A system is weakly 
controllable if, given a vector of desired targets, the Government can 
determine it by choosing an appropriate policy. Controllability clearly 
implies weak controllability but not conversely. Moreover, it should be 
noticed that controllability is an existence condition for the policy (existence 
problem). Thus it assures neither the uniqueness of the policy (uniqueness 
problem) nor how to determine it (policy design problem). 
Notice that controllability implies policy non-neutrality but the converse is 
not true. 
By defining the vector of the desired targets as 
m y ∈\ , existence conditions 
for a solution are easily found by applying standard mathematical 
techniques.
14  
Theorem 1 (controllability): the system  yC uC = +  is weakly controllable 
for the desired given vector of targets  y  if and only if 
[ ] [ ] : rank C y rank C = ; it is controllable for any vector of desired target 
m y ∈\  if and only if  [ ] rank C m = . 
                                                           
14 Formal proofs of the statements of this section are not reported since they summarize 
some well-known concepts. For an extensive discussion we refer to Preston and Pagan 
(1982).    9
Being  [ ] { } min , rank C m n ≤ ,  [ ] rank C m =  requires nm ≥ . Thus 
controllability embodies the famous Tinbergen’s precepts about the number 
of instruments and targets. Formally Tinbergen Theorem comprises two 
conditions. 
Theorem 2 (Tinbergen Theorem): The Government can achieve any vector 
of independent targets by an appropriate vector of instruments if and only if 
the number of independent instruments is equal to, or greater than, the 
number of targets. 
The theorem can be qualified for uniqueness, which requires 
[ ] rank C m n == , i.e. the number of independent targets must be equal to 
that of the independent instruments. The solution of the policy design is 
()( )
1 1 uC CC y A K
− − ′′ =− , which in the case of uniqueness becomes 
()
1 uB A yK
− =− . Henceforth, we will say that an equation system is TT-
controllable by a policymaker if the number of independent instruments 
equals that of independent targets. 
Now assuming that the policy model fails to satisfy the appropriate weak or 
strong existence criterion (controllability), the first best policy cannot be 
achieved but still the Government’s action can be effective, i.e. give it the 
possibility to have an influence on its objectives and to “go close to the 
unreachable targets.” Formally, failure to find a solution for the fixed target 
problem generates a second best policy, in terms of the flexible target 
approach.  
The flexible target approach is based on the minimization of a criterion 
(loss) function. A useful formalization of the Government’s cost for   10
deviations of the relevant variables from their target values is the following 
quadratic form: 
(4)  () () Uy y Q y y ′ =− − 
where Q is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. In equation (4) we do 
not explicitly consider instrument costs for a reason that will be clear below.  
Quadratic functions are used not only for their mathematical tractability, but 
also for their useful economic properties. In fact, deviations from the target 
are associated to increasing costs and, therefore, the marginal rate of 
substitution between any couple of target variables is never constant but 
depends on the values of the two variables in the point where it is 
computed.
15 In addition, quadratic forms can be obtained as second-order 
Taylor approximations of more complex functions (for a recent example, 
see Woodford, 2003: 392-404).
16  
The flexible target policy is obtained by minimizing equation (4) subject to 
equation (3). The corresponding first order condition is: 
(5)  ()
1 CQ C u CQ y A K
− ′′ =−  
                                                           
15 The relevance of the variability of the marginal rate of substitution as well as that of the 
instrument costs will be developed more in detail in section 5.  
16 More in detail, “quadratic cost functions are of particular interest in game theory, firstly 
because they constitute second-order approximations of other types of nonlinear functions, 
and secondly because they are analytically tractable, admitting in general closed-form 
equilibrium solutions which provide insights into the properties and features of the 
equilibrium solution concept into consideration.” (Başar and Olsder, 1995: 197). However, 
Taylor approximations are usually based on a more general specification of quadratic 
functions, which also includes linear terms. We refer to the latter as LQ-form, but introduce 
it only later since for the purposes of this section we can use the simpler quadratic form. 
For a more formal description of LQ-functions and their properties, see Frisch (1969), who 
is the father of the idea of loss functions representing the players’ preferences rather than 
the aggregation of those of individual agents, and Petit (1990: Chapter 6).    11
Equation (5) can be rewritten in short terms as  uK Φ Φ = . As in the previous 
case, existence of a solution is ensured if  [ ] [ ] : rank K rank Φ Φ =Φ . 
Uniqueness requires the non-singularity of Φ. The policy design clearly 
implies the following policy:  
(6)  ()()
1 1 uC Q CC Q y A K
− − ′′ =−   
If  nm = , the above policy becomes  ( )
1 uB A yK
− =−   –  t h e  s a m e  
expression found in the fixed target case – which implies  yy = . This result 
directly derives from the omission of explicit instrument costs from 
equation (4). Hence if we omit explicit instrument costs we can 
simultaneously consider both the fixed and the flexible target approaches.
17  
Before leaving this section, we must notice that when considering the 
flexible approach any policy is endogenous. In this context we find it 
convenient to redefine neutrality as follows. 
Definition 4 (endogenous policy neutrality): Economic policy is neutral with 
respect to a target variable i y , if its equilibrium value is not affected by any 
change in policymaker’s preferences.  
Definition 4 generalizes definition 2 in the same way as the flexible target 
approach nests the fixed one. 
                                                           
17 Notice that, without any loss of generality, each instrument can be decoupled into two 
variables by considering its possible double nature of instrument and variable of possible 
interest for the policymaker.      12
2.2 Controllability and sub (partial) controllability 
We have shown that, if the matrix C is square and full rank, the system is 
controllable. This is also the case of a rectangular matrix C with more 
columns (instruments) than row (targets) and a rank equal to the number of 
rows. By contrast, if C is a rectangular matrix with more rows than columns, 
the system is not controllable and a flexible target approach should be used. 
In this subsection we focus on this latter case.   
If C is a rectangular matrix with mn > , the Government cannot achieve the 
target vector (i.e. his first-best outcome) and will trade off between his 
targets. Because of the quadratic form of preferences, the Government does 
not generally find it optimal to reach any given target exactly since the gain 
of getting closer to it decreases as the deviation from it is reduced. However, 
there is a particular case in which the Government exactly achieves part of 
his targets and trades off only between the others. In other words, 
notwithstanding the decreasing marginal rate of substitution between targets 
implied by the quadratic preferences, there is a case in which the optimal 
policy of the Government, derived by the flexible target approach, implies 
that the Government can perfectly control part of the system. 
The reason is simple to explain. Imagine two distinct problems, one TT-
controllable by the Government and another that is not, e.g. a 2 targets by 2 
instruments and a 3 targets by 2 instruments independent LQ-problems. 
Merging the two problems together the Government will face a system of 5 
equations (targets) with 4 unknowns (instruments). Although the new 
system is not controllable in the sense of getting some pre-assigned values 
for all the 5 targets, by solving the Government’s optimization problem with   13
the flexible approach it is clear that the Government will achieve the first 
two targets (for any possible target vector) and will trade off between the 
other three as the two problems are independent. Hence the system is not 
controllable but the Government can always achieve the first two targets. In 
this case we speak of sub-controllability, i.e. the Government perfectly 
controls part of the system.
18  


































where  i M  for  { } 1,2,..., it ∈  are full-rank square matrices. 
Second, we define the BlockDiag operator, as an operator that by 
permutations and scalar normalization transforms a matrix in an M0-
augmented block diagonal form:  
(8)  [ ] [ ] 11 0 , ,... ,
BD
tt BlockDiag M M M M M − =  
where  0 M  is a square matrix if and only if C is a square matrix. Of course, 
if  [ ] 0 BlockDiag M M = ,  0 M M = .  
                                                           
18 It is worth noticing that, in general, the Government can always control part of the 
system (many target variables as many are controls can always be controlled), but here we 
are saying that it can perfectly control part of the system as a result of his optimization 
process.   14
Without loss of generality, we assume that matrix C is already written in a 
M0-augmented block diagonal form by preliminary appropriate row and/or 
column permutation:
19  
(9)  [ ] [ ] 11 0 , ,... ,
BD
tt CB l o c k D i a g C C C C C − ==  
Representing the economic system by (9) implies that the Government faces 
t controllable independent systems plus an additional independent system 
that is not controllable if C is not a full-rank square matrix. In other words, 
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targets by meaning that the Government can always achieve these targets by 
solving his optimization problem. 
By basic linear algebra, the set of controllable targets can be defined in 
more general terms. By defining  ( ) ei
n ∈\  as an eye vector, i.e. a vector of 
zero entries with the exception of the i-th entry, which is equal to one, and 
() col M  as the column set of matrix M,
20 we can define the controllable 
target set as follows. 
                                                           
19 Hence also all the other vectors are adjusted. Invariant normalizations of this kind are 
rather common (see e.g. Engwerda et al., 2002). 
20 Notice that the column set has not a unique representation, but infinite equivalent ones.   15
Definition 5 (controllable target set). The controllable target set, associated 
with the Government’s problem: max  () () Uy y Q y y ′ = −−  subject to 
AyB uK =+ , is  () ( ) {} { }
1 span , 1,2,..., i yei c o lAB i n
− ⎡⎤ Θ= ∈ ∈ ⎣⎦ . 
It is easy to verify that if the number of independent instruments is equal to 
(or greater than) the number of independent targets, 
() ()
1 span ei c o lAB
− ⎡ ⎤ ∀∈ ⎣ ⎦  and, therefore,  i y ∈Θ for  { } 1,2,.., in ∀∈ . In 
other words, the system  AyB uK = +  is controllable.
21 
 
3. A revised target/instruments approach  
3.1 The policy game approach 
The well-known Lucas critique highlights the need to model policy decision 
within a strategic context,
22 where the policymaker interacts with at least 
another decision maker, usually the private sector. The policy game 
approach in fact consists of directly modeling the behavior of players by 
considering separate but not independent optimization problems.  
For the sake of simplicity we consider only two players, the public sector 
(or Government) and the private sector (or Agent); however, the approach 
can be clearly generalized to the case of more players. In addition, we 
mainly discuss the neutrality of the Government’s policy (i.e. policy 
                                                           
21 An example is provided by Appendix B. 
22 A usual way to model the private sector anticipation is provided by the rational 
expectation techniques. A more general way to get the same result is to directly model the 
private sector behavior and, hence, the players’ interactions by using the policy game 
approach. Introducing rational expectations is indeed a particular case in the policy game 
approach, as we show in Appendix C.         16
neutrality), but all our results can be applied also to case of the Agent’s 
policy or generalized.  
The extension of the TTA to a strategic context needs a number of 
additional qualifications.  
a)  We should consider the possibility that the two players share some 
target variables, while some others are peculiar to each one.  
b)  A linear algebraic system more general than system (2) must be 
considered. The latter should be augmented with the relationships 
concerning the target variables the private sector does not share with 
the Government.  
c)  It is useful to decouple the optimization process into two traditional 
TT-optimization processes, one for each player.  
d)  Finally, the kind of interactions (equilibrium) between the players 
must be specified. 
More formally, we operate in four steps. 
a) We first distinguish three vectors of target variable vectors. 
1.  The vector of variables of interest for the Government only: 
ug y ∈\ . 
2.  The vector of shared target variables, which are of interest for both 
players: 
s l y ∈\ . Notice that  ( ) ,
us yy y =  and g + l = m. 
3.  The vector of variables of interest for the Agent only: 
wv y ∈\ . 
Regarding the instruments: 
1.  The instrument vector controlled by the Government is, as 
previously, 
n u \ ∈ .   17
2.  The instrument vector controlled by the Agent is 
p w \ ∈ .  
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 i.e. A uw xD uD w − −= Κ , 
where  () ,,
usw x yyy = . Coefficient matrices of appropriate dimensions are 
indicated by D variables. Notice that the above equation system contains v 
equations more than sub-system (2). We extract for matrix A  two squared 
sub-matrices 
mm A
× ∈\  and  
mvmv A
+ ×+ ∈  \ . The former is obtained by 
eliminating columns and rows from  1 m+  on. The latter is obtained by 






, i.e. B , and  :
sw
ww DD
′ ⎡ ⎤ ′ ′
⎣ ⎦
 are full-rank matrices. As in the 
parametric decision case, the meaning of the full-rank assumptions is 
independence of targets and instruments in each single player’s problem.   
The reduced form of the model is: 
(11) 
11 1 AA A uw xD uD w
−− − =++ Κ  
c) Finally, in order to express the policy game approach in terms similar to 
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i.e.  yC uE wF =++ , 
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   
i.e. zC wE uF =++   . 
where  () ,
s w zy y =  is the vector of Agent’s target variables.  
Equation (12) represents the constraint of the Government in solving the 
optimization problem in the TTA, i.e. the given Agent’s control. Notice that 
(12) is equivalent to equation (2). Equation (13) is the corresponding 
constraint for the Agent’s problem, i.e. when the Agent solves its problem 
by considering the Government’s instruments as given. Then, taking 
account of the above constraints, the two players minimize the following 
quadratic losses:  
(14)  () () Uy y Q y y ′ =− − 
(15)  () () Wz z N z z ′ =− − 
where  () ,
us yy y =  and  ( ) ,
s w zz z =  are respectively appropriate vectors of 
Government’s and Agent’s targets; Q and N are symmetric positive semi-
definite matrices, which for the sake of simplicity we assume to be both 
diagonal, i.e., with no cross products.  
According to Theorem 2, system (12) ((13)) is TT-controllable by the 
Government (Agent) if the number of Government’s (Agent’s) instruments 
is equal to the number of Government’s (Agent’s) targets.  
d) We consider three common kinds of possible interactions based on 
different time protocols and, correspondingly, different equilibrium   19
concepts obtained by solving the following optimization problems with 
respect to u and w:
24 
(16) N    { min
u  eq. (14) s.t. eq. (12), min
w  eq. (15) s.t. eq. (13)  }  
(17) C    { min
u  eq. (14) s.t. {min
w  eq. (15) s.t. eq. (13) }, eq. (12)  } 
(18) D    {min
w  eq. (15) s.t. { min
u  eq. (14) s.t. eq. (12) }, eq. (13) } 
In words, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (N) corresponds to a 
situation in which both decision-makers play simultaneously and hence each 
of them has to form expectations on the opponent’s policy. In the case of the 
Commitment equilibrium (C), the Government is the (Stackelberg) game 
leader, who forms expectations on the opponent’s behavior, it can commit 
himself to a policy rule, i.e. a policy that is not contingent on that of the 
other player. Finally, in the Discretionary equilibrium (D), the Government 
is a Stackelberg follower and cannot commit its policy whereas the Agent 
forms expectations on the Government’s policy.  
In all the above cases the expectations of the players are rational since they 
are self-fulfilling (see Appendix C). The result directly derives from the 
rationality assumption of the players and from the Nash equilibrium 
definition.
25 However, the relationship between a model with rational 
expectations and a policy game is sometimes a source of confusion.
26  
                                                           
24 In all cases perfect information and players’ rationality are assumed. 
25 Notice that formally all the three situations describe a Nash equilibrium, which in the 
Stackelberg game is also perfect in the sub-games, i.e. it is also a Nash equilibrium of the 
sub-games.  
26 Rational expectation models are indeed semi-reduced forms of policy games that 
transform a two-player optimization problem into a one-player optimization problem 
constrained by some additional condition imposed by the rival’s rational expectations.   20
Summarizing, a decision problem in a strategic context has been reduced to 
two TT-optimization problems, which can be studied with the tools used in 
the traditional approach of economic policy. 
3.2 Policy neutrality    
In the above decoupled representation of the policy game, a straightforward 
condition for neutrality can be defined as follows. Provided that equilibrium 
exists, the Government’s policy is neutral with respect to the targets shared 
with the Agent, if the system formed by the last cw cs +  equations of (13) is 
TT-controllable by the Agent.
27  
Although it is intuitive, the above condition nests an apparent contradiction, 
since the Agent’s TT-controllability does not exclude that also the 
Government can TT-control its sub-system. As we will show, the 
contradiction is however only apparent. In fact, were this the case, the 
equilibrium would not exist. The issue of equilibrium existence is indeed 
crucially related to that of controllability and neutrality, as the following 
theorem more formally states. 
Theorem 3 (Government’s policy existence and neutrality). (i) The 
equilibrium of the game in the target space exists if the intersection of the 
players’ controllable sets is empty or the players share the same target 
values for the variables therein contained. (ii) The Government’s policy is 
                                                                                                                                                    
Hence they correspond to a policy game of the third kind, the discretionary equilibrium. 
However, notice that rational expectation games are often solved by using the Nash 
equilibrium. This occurs because the control variable of the forecaster is the same forecast 
on a target (not an instrument) variable. In addition, in these, the Nash and Stackelberg 
equilibria with the forecaster leadership coincide.   
27 The following theorem also generalizes the above claims to the sub-controllability 
concept introduced in section 2.2.   21
neutral for all the Government’s target variables contained in the Agent’s 
controllable target set.  
Indicating formal necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
Nash equilibrium is not a negligible task.
28 However, our LQ-context 
simplifies the discussion. Here, the existence problem is related to the 
solution of a linear-equation system and, therefore, can be reduced to some 
rank conditions. A proof of the above theorem in the target-variable space 
follows (See Appendix D for a formal proof in the usual control space).  
Proof. Nash equilibrium is usually computed by the inversion of the 
coefficient matrix of players’ reaction functions, but it can also be derived 
directly in the target-variable space (dual problem) by simultaneously 
solving the system of the following first order conditions:
29 
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Since both matrices C and C  are full rank by assumption, 
() ( ) min , rank C n g l =+  and  ( ) () min , rank C p l v = +  . Moreover, we can 
restrict ourselves to the most relevant cases: ngl ≤ +  and  p lv ≤ + .
30 
                                                           
28 After Nash (1951), existence of Nash equilibrium has been studied, among others, by 
Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). See the textbooks by 
Rasmusen (1989:124-127), Friedman (1991: 68-77), and Fudemberg and Tirole (1991: 34-
35) for general discussions.  
29 Equations (28) and (29) define the system of the “quasi-best reply functions,” i.e. the 
system of the reaction functions in the space of the targets (see e.g. Cubitt, 1992)  
30 The discussion can be easily generalized to the case of a number of instruments greater 
than that of the target variables.   22
By assuming that both players can perfectly control their sub-systems, 
matrices  CQ ′  and CN ′   are square (of order ngl = +  and  p lv =+, 
respectively) and thus  yy =  and  zz =  follow. This result is consistent only 
in the trivial cases of either inexistence of shared targets or 
s s yz = , i.e. a 
non-conflict solution exists.
31 In other words, if both players TT-control 
their sub-systems, the system formed by equations (19) and (20) would be 
over-determined, as  2 npgv l +=+ + independent equations would be used 
to find gvl ++ independent unknowns.
32 
Once the first part of the theorem is acquired, the proof of the second part is 
rather intuitive. If the Agent is able to TT-control its sub-system, it can 
reach all its targets, including the shared target variables. Hence, 
Government policy is neutral with respect to the shared target variables, as 
claimed. If also the Government controlled its sub-system the intersection of 
the Government and Agent controllable target sets would be not empty, the 
equilibrium would not exists. Thus the theorem is verified.      
Proof extension (Stackelberg equilibria). The above inconsistencies can 
emerge for Stackelberg equilibria as well. In fact, if one player is able to 
                                                           
31 It is straightforward to notice that in non-conflict solution neutrality would hold even if 
the Government achieves its targets.  In fact, changes in the Government’s preferences 
either do not affect the equilibrium outcomes (as changes in marginal rates of substitution) 
or imply non existence (as in the case of changes in target values of shared variables 
contained in the intersection of the players’ controllable sets). 
32 The same inconsistency can also emerge in the case of sub-controllability. In fact, if the 
same shared target variable could be independently determined by both the Government 
from a sub-system of equations (19) and by the Agent from a sub-system of equations (20), 
the system formed by equations (19) and (20) would be consistent if and only if the 
Government and the Agent also share the same target values for the shared target variables. 
Otherwise the two sub-systems would be inconsistent with the solution of the system 
formed by equations (19) and (20) of which they are a part.    23
control one or many target variables, his optimal policy is independent of 
the kind of policy-game solution considered.     
The reason why an issue of existence can emerge in our context may also be 
usefully discussed in terms of the conditions required by a well-known Nash 
equilibrium theorem of existence with bounded strategies (i.e. instrument 
costs). In one-shot games, a Nash equilibrium always exists if i) the space of 
strategies of each player is convex and compact; ii) the payoff function of 
each player is a definite, bounded, and continuous function for each 
strategic combination; iii) the player i’s payoff function is concave with 
respect to each player i’s strategy for all possible strategic combinations and 
for all the players.  
In our case condition i) is not met since the players’ controls are 
unbounded.
33 Hence the equilibrium non-existence discussed above is a 
possible outcome. In policy games, quadratic costs for instrumental 
variables are often introduced in order to achieve solution existence.
34 In 
this case instruments become bounded and the Nash equilibrium always 
exists. Formally, the introduction of quadratic instrument costs in our 
context would imply that the dimensions of matrices Q and N become 
gln ++  and vlp ++ , respectively. Thus, the instruments’ number would 
be less than the targets’ and the system would not be TT-controllable by any 
player.
35  
                                                           
33 See, e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). 
34 Instrument costs are also often used in numerical optimization problem involving 
calibration techniques. In such cases, instrument costs are introduced to smooth the 
Government’s policy in order to get result in line with the empirical observations. 
35 The same argument applies to sub-controllability. In fact, by introducing instrument costs 
all the sub-systems that were sub-controllable would also become non-controllable since all   24
The above results can be intuitively summarized and generalized to Z-
players as follows.
36  
Theorem 4 (equilibrium existence and neutrality generalized). (i) The 
equilibrium of a policy game between Z player exists (in the target space) if 
the intersection of their controllable target sets is empty or if the variables 
contained in the set are associated with the same quantitative target for all 
the players which control them. (ii) Player z’s policy is neutral for all its 
targets contained in the intersection set of the other players’ controllable 
target sets. 
 
4. A generalization to LQ-losses
37  
In the previous section we have assumed quadratic losses; here we 
generalize our results to LQ-preferences. In policy games, LQ-losses are 
often used, especially for computational purposes.
38 LQ-expressions for 
players’ losses are:  
(21)  () () Uy y Q y yy R ′ ′ =− −+  
(22)  () () Wz z N z zz H ′ ′ =− −+  
                                                                                                                                                    
the sub-systems that were square (controllable) in the M0-augmented block diagonal form 
would no longer be square including now instrument costs. 
36 Proof is intuitive and directly follows from Theorem 3.  
37 Notice that until now we have considered a linear model with strictly quadratic 
preferences and we have referred to it as the LQ-case. In this section, instead, we consider a 
linear model with LQ-preferences. Throughout this section, with no loss of generality 
(extensions of results are trivial), we will not formally discuss the sub-controllability, i.e. 
we assume  [ ] 0 BlockDiag C C =  . 
38 Indeed, LQ-functions generalize quadratic ones. However, if some arguments enter the 
loss function only linearly, computations are easier.      25
which generalize equations (14) and (15). We assume that for each player at 
least one target variable enters its loss function in a quadratic form – 
otherwise the problem becomes trivial. In addition, for the sake of 
simplicity, the players are assumed not to be interested in cross products 
between their target variables.
39  
The extension of conditions for policy existence and neutrality to LQ-losses 
is simple and can be done along the lines of our previous analysis; however, 
it nests some further technical complexities. In particular, stronger 
conditions for the equilibrium existence and a weaker form of neutrality are 
involved.  
We will deal with existence first. However, before passing to this issue, we 
must clarify the implications of LQ preferences for optimal policies. A 
generic entry of the LQ-loss for the Government is  ()
2
, ii i i i i Qyy R y −+, 
which collapses to a quadratic term for  0 i R = . Hence, the optimum 










− , instead of  i y  (as in the 
quadratic case), and it does not exist as a finite value if  , 0 ii Q =  (in such a 
case  i y =± ∞ is optimal for the player according to the sign of  i R ). Hence, 
if a decision-maker is able to TT-control the system, it will optimally set its 
instrument vector at the value associated with its optimum optimorum 
instead of having zero deviations from the target vector.  
Now we can deal with the issue of existence. Because of the linear terms in 
the loss functions, a specific problem arises, leading to more stringent 
                                                           
39 Formally, with reference to equation (29), Qi,j = 0 for i ≠ j; if Qi,j = 0, R ≠ 0 and vice   26
conditions for the equilibrium existence.
40 If a player can TT-control a 
system, it sets its instruments in order to achieve values of its target 










−  in the case 
of the Agent. But, if  , 0 ii N =  for some i, the optima optimorum for those 
target variables no longer exist and the Agent’s problem cannot be solved 
(for finite values of instrumental variables). Hence, if a target variable that 
enters U (W) only linearly is in Government’s (Agent’s) controllable target 
set, the equilibrium does not exist. Generalizing the first part of Theorem 4 
to the case of LQ preferences, the existence problem can be summarized as 
in the theorem below, which implies stronger conditions for the equilibrium 
existence. 
Theorem 5 (equilibrium existence extended). An equilibrium in the target 
space of a policy game between the Z players exists if i) The first part of 
Theorem 4 holds or ii) any player’s controllable target set does not contain 
any target variable that enters its loss linearly only. 
Proof. Formally, by deriving first order conditions from equations (21) and 
(22), we can write them as quasi-reaction functions as follows: 
(23)  () 20
U
CQ y y CR
u
∂ ′′ =− + =
∂
n ∈\  
(24)  () 20
W
CN z z CH
w
∂ ′′ =− + =
∂
 p ∈\  
                                                                                                                                                    
versa; however, Qi,j≠ 0 at least for one target.  Similar assumptions hold for equation (22). 
40 As, in LQ preferences, target variables that enter only linearly imply unbounded payoff 
functions.   27
Equations (23) and (24) are obtained from two separate optimization 
problems and represent the optimal values of the target variables that assure 
the minimization of each player’s loss, given the policy of the other one. 
Thus, by definition of Nash equilibrium, both condition (23) and (24) have 
to be mutually verified to describe the Nash equilibrium of the policy 
game.
41  Formally, Equations (23) and (24) define np +  conditions for 
2 uw s ++  unknowns, by mapping the vector of target variables into that of 
the target desired values.
42 Now assume that the Government’s system is 
TT-controllable. If  , 0 ii Q = , the i-th column of matrix CQ ′ is a zero vector. 
Hence, matrix CQ ′  cannot be inverted and system (23) is over-determined 
as from Theorem 5. In words, the Government can control the system, but 
one of its targets takes an infinite value and a finite solution does not then 
exist.
43  
The existence of target variables that enter the players’ loss functions only 
linearly implies also additional complications from the point of view of 
policy neutrality. The second part of Theorems 3 and 4 becomes. 
Theorem 6 (Government’s extended policy neutrality). Provided that either 
the Nash or Commitment equilibrium of the policy game between the 
Government and the Agent exist, the Government’s policy is neutral for all 
                                                           
41 We will later extend our discussion to the Stackelberg cases (i.e. Commitment and 
Discretion). However, see also the proof extension of Theorem 3. 
42 It is worth noticing that condition (23) represents the Government’s dual problem of that 
described by equation (5), i.e. Government’s reaction function. Clearly if the Government 
can solve equation (5) for any vector of desired target variables (TT-controllability), it can 
also control the system (23). If the reaction function system, i.e. equation (5), is over-
determined, the quasi-reaction function system is under-determined; and vice versa. The 
same is true for the Agent’s problem.   28
the shared Government’s target variables, if the number of instruments of 
the Agent is equal to the number of its quadratic target variables. 
Notice that Theorem 6 generalizes the second part of Theorem 3 only for 
Nash and Commitment, whereas neutrality under Discretion still depends on 
the second part of Theorem 3. 
Proof. By assuming that the Agent’s system is TT-controllable, i.e. 
p lv =+, the Government policy is neutral, if an equilibrium exists. 
However, if  , 0 ii N = , the i-th column of matrix CN ′   is a zero vector. Hence, 
system (24) is under-determined, i.e. the corresponding reaction function 
system that maps instruments into desired targets is over-determined (the 
difference between equations and independent unknowns is one) and the 
equilibrium does not exist since in such a case it is optimal for the Agent to 
set the p−1 instruments to equalize the square targets to its optima 
optimorum and to set the remaining one equal at an infinite value to achieve 
an infinite value of the i-th target variable. But if the number of the Agent’s 
instruments is equal to m−1, system (24) is exactly determined, as the 
number of independent equations is equal to the number of independent 
unknowns. More generally, if the number of independent instruments of the 
Agent is equal to the number of independent square-target variables, the 
Agent can control equation (24), and either Government’s policy is neutral 
or the Nash equilibrium does not exists.  
Proof extension (Stackelberg equilibria). The above discussion can be also 
extended to the case of Commitment since in such a case equation (24) must 
                                                                                                                                                    
43 A similar situation arises when the system is TT-controllable by the Agent and some 
targets appear only linearly in the Agent’s preference function.   29
be verified in equilibrium. By contrast, the conditions stressed in this section 
cannot be applied to Discretion. In such a case, in equilibrium the quasi-
reaction function of the Agent does not hold and neutrality does not emerge 
since the equilibrium is determined by the tangency of the Agent’s 
preferences to equation (23).  
It is finally worth noticing that even if Government’s neutrality holds, the 
Nash and Commitment equilibria may be not a first best for the Agent when 
some targets enter its preference only linearly.
44 Thus the Agent could raise 
its utility if it is able to change the equilibrium finite value of linear targets. 
This is possible in the Discretion case, where the Agent may be able to use 
its first-move advantage to achieve a loss lower than those associated with 
Nash and Commitment equilibria taking account of the Government 
preferences.
45     
 
5. A closer look at the literature on monetary policy neutrality 
5.1 Barro and Gordon (1983) 
The most celebrated policy game is probably Barro and Gordon (1983).
46 A 










p Pn n =− −  
                                                           
44 Differently from the strictly quadratic case, here the first best can never be reached since 
it implies an infinity value for linear target variables. 
45 See Acocella et al. (2003) and Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004) for some examples.  
46 See also Stokey (1990), Cubitt (1992), Sargent (2002).   30
(27)  ()
e
p np pn =− +  
where G is the Government’s loss, depending on employment (n) and price 
(p) deviations from a target, P is a similar function for the private sector, 
and equation (27) describes the baseline structure of the economy. The 
government controls inflation whereas the private sector controls inflation 
expectations. Alternatively, but without different implications, one can 
assume that the private sector loss is defined in terms of expectation 
deviations, i.e.  ()
1
2
e p p −− .  
The trivial well-known Nash solution of the model is: 









By assuming a1 and a2 finite and different from zero, in equation (25) the 
Government has two independent target variables and one instrument. 
Hence, system (27) is not TT-controllable for the Government and its 
controllable target set,  G Θ , is empty. By contrast, the private sector has one 
target variable and one control variable. Thus, equation (27) is TT-
controllable by the private sector, i.e. its controllable target set is   { } P n Θ= . 
Being  GP Θ∩ Θ= ∅  and   { } P n Θ= , a solution exists and government’s 
policy is neutral with respect to employment. 
If  1 0 a = , we have  { } G p Θ= ,  { } P n Θ= , and  GP Θ ∩Θ =∅. Hence we a 
solution exists, but the Government is neutral with respect to employment 
and the private sector is neutral with respect to price. This result can be   31
easily checked from equations (28)-(29). By contrast, for  2 0 a =  system (27) 
is TT-controllable for both policymakers, who also share the same target 
variable. Thus,  { } GP n Θ∩ Θ=  is non-empty and two possibilities arise. 
Either the two policymakers share the same target value (i.e.  g p nn = ), and a 
trivial solution exists, or the solution does not exist since the equilibrium 
price goes to infinity. 
It is easy to verify that all these claims hold,
47 if we consider a more 
complex economy where the government directly sets the quantity of 
money, m, instead of the price level according to (demand side): 
(30)  nmp =− 
and the private sector sets the nominal wage, w, rather than price 
expectations, which are finally determined by (supply side): 
(31)  np w =− 
5.2 Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) and the union’s  inflation aversion 
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994)
48 make a step further by considering the 
private sector distortion as endogenous. These authors consider the 
economic structure (30)-(31) and assume that a monopoly union directly 
controls the nominal wage, w, to maximize: 
(32)  () ()()




Pw p n n p p ω =− − − − − − −  
where  p ω  is the union’s desired real wage. 
The Nash equilibrium of the above game turns out to be: 
                                                           
47 See Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) or the next sub-section for b3 = 0. 
48 See also, among others, Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) or Cubitt (1997).   32
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The problem of the government is clearly the same already discussed. For a1 
and a2 finite and different from zero, system (30)-(31) is not TT-controllable 
by the government and the set  G Θ  is empty.  
The union’s apparently faces three-targets and one-instrument problem. 
However, equation (31) clearly highlights that the real wage and 
employment are not independent target variables. Thus, by using equation 
(31), it is convenient to rewrite equation (32) in a different form: 
(35)  ()




Pn b n p pK =+ −−+

  
where  ( ) 11 2 bb b =− +  ,  ( ) 212 pp bb b n ω =− −  , and  ( )
22
12 pp Kbb n ω =− + . Now 
preferences of the union are expressed in terms of independent target 
variables.   
With references to equation (35), first consider the case of indifference to 
inflation (i.e. b3 = 0). In such a case we have that the union preference is 
linear quadratic and the union has one instrument for one target variable. 
The union can thus control the system and get its optima optimorum as the 
number of its instruments equals the number of its (quadratic) target 
variables. According to Theorem 6 this implies that – if the equilibrium 
exists – the Government is neutral with respect to employment. The result   33
can be easily verified for  3 0 b =  from equations (33) and (34). Notice that if 
() 11 2 0 bb b =− + =  , Nash equilibrium does not exist as stated by Theorem 5. 
An inflation-averse union would have two independent target variables (one 
linear quadratic and another quadratic only) and one instrument. Hence, 
Theorem 5 would not apply. A solution exists (see Theorem 5) and no 
policy is neutral.
49 
5.3 The wage-wedge in a small-open economy 
A different way used to obtain non-neutrality of monetary policy is that of 
inserting inflation indirectly into the union’s preference as e.g. in Acocella 
and Di Bartolomeo (2004). Together with the supply equation (31), consider 
now the following simple logarithmic demand instead of equation (30):
50 
(36)   () ()
* 1 nmp pep µ =−− − − −  
where e and p
* are the exogenously given nominal exchange rate and the 
foreign price level respectively, ( ) 1 µ −  is the real exchange rate elasticity of 
output.
51 For the sake of brevity, without loss of generality, we assume e 
and p
* equal to zero. 
                                                           
49 By considering a similar setup, a further application can be made by using Cubitt (1997) 
and Acocella and Ciccarone (1997). The former allows us to verify that our conditions hold 
in the cooperative solution, whereas the latter allows us to verify the existence condition 
provided by Theorem 6 since Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) use union’s preferences that 
are linear in the real wage and quadratic in employment. In a more complex setup, Acocella 
and Ciccarone (1997) use the public deficit instead of inflation as a shared objective to 
obtain non-neutrality. See also Detken and Gärtner (1994) doe a different approach.  
50 Here we use a simplified version of Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2002) to which we 
refer for more details. 
51 By assuming h = 1 and µ = 0, we have the traditional closed economy setup already 
analyzed.    34
In this economy, the policymaker sets the nominal money supply and the 
union sets the nominal wage. The Government loss is derived from equation 
(25): 
(37)    ()
2 2 1
22
g Gp n n
β
=− − −  
where  12 aa β =  and  0 g p = . The union loss is a generalization of equation 
(26):
52 





pp Pw c p i w c p i n n p
α ϑ
αω =− −− − − − −  
where  ( )
* 1 cpi h p hp =− +   is the consumer price index and h is the weight 
of foreign goods in the consumption basket of wage-earners. Here the 
relevant real wage for firms could differ from the real wage relevant for the 
union. The relevant real wage for firms, wp − , is expressed in terms of 
producer prices while the one relevant for the union, wc p i − , is in terms of 
the consumer price index. 
The Nash equilibrium level of output and the Nash equilibrium price level 
are: 
(39)    ( )( ) ( )
() () ( )
21 2
2
PP G nh h h n
n
hh
βµ β µ α ω α µ α ϑ
βµ α β µ ϑ
−+ + + ++ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ =
+++ +
 
(40)    ( )( ) ( )
() () ( )
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2
PP G hn h n
p
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µα α ω µ µ α µ
βµ α β µ ϑ
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By assuming that the union is the game leader, and solving the game by 
backward induction, Stackelberg outcomes are: 
                                                           
52 Notice that both equations (37) and (38) are normalized by the employment weight 
without loss of generality.   35
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Let us analyze the above result in the TTA terms. First of all, by using 
equation (31) and the cpi definition, in order to obtain a relation between 
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pp n αω −+  
Notice that if either  2 α  or ϑ  are different from zero the union has two 
independent target variables and one instrument; thus  P Θ =∅. If  1 α  is 
finite and both   2 α  and ϑ  are equal to zero, the union cares for inflation 
linearly and for employment in a quadratic manner. If  1 α ,  2 α  and ϑ  are all 
zero, the union takes account of employment only; thus  { } P n Θ= . 
By looking at the government’s problem, the system is TT-controllable in 
two cases: a) for  0 β =  (i.e.  { } G n Θ= ); and b) for β = +∞  (i.e.  { } G p Θ= ) 
– otherwise  G Θ= ∅ . 
Putting all together, from equations (39)-(42), it is easy to verify the 
following properties.   36
1.  If  1 α ,  2 α , ϑ ,  β  are zero, then  { } PG n Θ∩ Θ=  is non empty and a 
solution does not exists.
53 
2.  If  1 α ,  2 α , ϑ  are zero and  0 β ≠ , then  PG Θ ∩Θ =∅ and  { } P n Θ= . 
Thus monetary policy is neutral with respect to employment, i.e.  P nn = . 
3.  If  1 α ,  2 α , ϑ  are zero and β = +∞ , then  PG Θ ∩Θ =∅,  { } P n Θ= , 
and   { } G p Θ= . Thus monetary policy is neutral with respect to employment 
and wage policy is neutral with respect to the price level, i.e.  P nn =  and 
0 p = . 
In addition, if linear-quadratic preferences are also considered (i.e.  1 0 α ≠  ), 
by referring to Theorem 5 and 6, we can verify the following properties. 
4.  If  2 α , ϑ  are zero and  0 β ≠ , then in the Nash equilibrium monetary 
policy is neutral with respect to employment, but it not always true that 
P nn =  (that holds only for  1 0 α =  since  ( ) 1 1 P nn h µ α =− + ). By contrast, 
in the Stackelberg equilibrium it is not neutral, i.e.  ( ) 1 1 P nn h β α =− + . 
Moreover, although neutrality does not hold, it can be verified the loss of 
the union under the discretion is lower than the loss in the Nash regime. 
This highlights the different kind of neutrality arising in the LQ-preference 
case, i.e. neutrality does not imply the achievement of the best possible 
outcome.  
5.4 Monopolistic competition and wage setters 
More recent contributions in the policy game literature stress a new channel 
of monetary non-neutrality. Among other innovative results directly related 
                                                           
53 The proof is trivial from denominator inspection.   37
to the non-neutrality of monetary policy, Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000), 
Coricelli et al. (2002) and Cukierman and Lippi (2002) show that if there 
are a multiplicity of unions and product markets are monopolistically 
competitive, a Barro-Gordon framework delivers policy non-neutrality, even 
if unions are not directly averse to inflation.
54  
We can describe a model of the above kind in a simple way.
55 In the 
economy n unions and a central bank are active. The central bank seeks to 






=− − . 
where p is the price level and u is the unemployment rate. Each union seeks 
to maximize a linear-quadratic preference function with the membership’s 






ii i Ub wp u =− −    { } 1,2,... in ∈ , 
The economy consists of three equations:
56  
(46) 
() () () ()
1
11
ii uw pm p
η




(47)  () 1 p wm αα =+ −  
                                                           
54 See Cukierman (2004) for a survey. 
55 We simplify Jerger (2002) and Acocella et al. (2004) to which we refer for more details. 
For the sake of brevity, we present the model in its essential aspects only. All intermediate 
computations are not described. 
56 Equation (46) refers to the (micro) disaggregate equilibrium conditions whereas Equation 
(46) and (48) to the (macro) aggregate ones. More in detail, equation (46) is the union’s 
employment function stemming from a traditional labor demand derived by real profit 
maximization assuming a Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s (1987) firm’s demand. Equation (46) 









where wi is the wage set by the i union;  1 η >  is the degree of monopolistic 
competition and  () 0,1 α ∈  is the labor coefficient of the productions 
function,  () 1 ij ww w σσ =+ −  is the average wage, the general level of 
prices is defined according to the Dixit-Stigliz’s tradition as 
1
0 ij p pd j =∫ . 
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where  i w−  is the average wage of the unions different of union i. Notice that 
the three target variables are independent. 
By solving the model the Nash equilibrium is:  
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. In order to evaluate possible non-neutrality, 
notice that φ  is the only parameter containing central bank’s preference.  
By solving the model the Stackelberg equilibrium (unions’ leaders) is:    39
(52)  () () ( ) ( ) ( )
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αφα φ σα α η
ηα φ α φ σ α σ φ
−− + + −
=>
−− + + +
. 
Let us analyze the above result in the TTA terms. First of all, one can notice 
that the central bank problem is the same as that analyzed in the above 
subsection. The sub-system formed by the first two rows of equation (49) is 
TT-controllable by the central bank only in two cases:  0 β =  (i.e. 
{ } G n Θ= ) and β =+ ∞ (i.e.  { } G p Θ= ); otherwise  G Θ =∅. 
Regarding a representative union, for convenience, after manipulations, we 
can rewrite equation as 
(54)  ( ) 2 1 1
2
ii i Uu u u
γα η α γ
η η
+− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =− + −  
Each union has one instrument and two target variables. Thus if γ is finite 
and different from zero,  P Θ= ∅ . However, not surprisingly, even if the 
system (49) is not TT-controllable by the representative union,
57 by 
Theorem 6, we can claim that the model implies neutrality in the Nash 
equilibrium, because the linear-quadratic nature of equation (54), and non-
neutrality in the Stackelberg one (discretion) as equations  (51) and (53) 
confirm. As a result, if  β  and  1 b  are different from zero neutrality does not 
emerge unless 
( ) 1 0
αη α
η
+−= . In fact, for η →+ ∞ (perfect competition), 
                                                           
57 I.e. union i’s equilibrium unemployment is not zero.   40
equation (54) becomes 
2 1
2
ii Uu =−  and standard results arise. In such a case 
i uu =  and  { } P i u Θ= . Other checks similar to those used above can be 
easily made by varying parameter values. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
This paper generalizes the classic theory of economic policy to the more 
recent strategic approach of policy games. We have shown how a revised 
version of the Tinbergen-Theil’s traditional theory can deal with policy 
neutrality problems, taking fully account of the Lucas critique. We have also 
shown how it can be profitably used to deal with equilibrium existence 
conditions in policy games. 
In a game theoretical perspective, controllability and neutrality are dual 
concepts. Controllability for one player implies neutrality for the other one. 
Of course, controllability needs to be reinterpreted to take account of the 
strategic nature of context. Once this has been done, neutrality merely 
becomes an instrument/target accounting problem in the traditional 
Tinbergen-Theil’s vein. 
We have shown that controllability by a player of a subset of variables 
always implies neutrality of all the others’ policies for the same subset (if an 
equilibrium exists), but the reverse does not hold. In particular, by 
generalizing our investigation to the case of constant marginal rates of 
substitution between targets, we have shown how neutrality can emerge if 
the counting rule of the number of instruments and targets is violated. 
However, the neutrality emerging in such a case has a different nature since   41
it does not imply the realization of the player’s optimum optimorum (which 
does not exist because of the non-satiation). Hence, it leaves an open room 
for different arrangements as cooperation or policy leadership, which could 
be associated with lower loss levels.  
It is finally worth summarizing and briefly discussing the main assumptions 
implicitly or explicitly used.  
1.  Complete, symmetric and perfect information contexts.  
2.  LQ-preference functions with linear economic relationships. 
3.  Static policy games. 
All the above assumptions were also used in the seminal Tinbergen and 
Theil approach and almost all of them have been relaxed by sequels without 
deeply affect their simple logic. Our results can be similarly generalized, but 
some additional complications arise in some cases.  
As in Tinbergen and Theil, a straightforward generalization is possible with 
the perfect information assumption, which can be relaxed by introducing 
linear uncertainty and discussing our results in expected terms. In general, a 
similar extension is not possible for model uncertainty or incomplete and 
asymmetric information since the certainty equivalence no longer holds. 
Indeed, we are not very interested in similar cases where – as is well known 
– neutrality generally does not hold.
58 However, our results may still apply 
as particular cases.
59 
                                                           
58 See e.g. Brainard (1967), Rogoff (1983) and Vickers (1986) as preeminent examples. It is 
also worth to notice that complete information rules out Bayesian equilibria, which are 
however generally characterized by non neutrality. See Holly and Hughes Hallett (1998) for 
a complete discussion on model uncertanty.   
59 More precisely, if uncertainty directly or indirectly only affects the equation blocks or the 
players’ preferences that are not relevant for the neutrality conditions.    42
We have considered the LQ-case to follow Preston and Pagan (1982), who 
generalize the fixed and flexible approaches. Our extension to LQ 
preferences highlights the complexities that can arise when non-satiation is 
introduced. Further extensions to non-linear contexts and more general 
preferences exhibit similar problems and should probably be analyzed case 
by case. We have considered the LQ-case also for reasons of tractability and 
because it is rather common in the policy games we are interested in.  
The static assumption, rather common in policy games,
60 is mainly justified 
for its tractability. Although, in principle, the simple logic of our discussion 
can be extended to dynamic contexts,
61 as for the Tinbergen and Theils’s 
seminal contribution, formal generalizations face many computational and 
practical problems. For instance, general existence conditions for 
differential or difference games are difficult to derive, especially in the 
infinite horizon case.
62 Moreover, many different kinds of equilibrium must 
be considered since time implies various information assumptions, as e.g. 
feedback or open-loop structures.
63 Our results have however an immediate 
practical extension to the steady state existence and long-run neutrality in 
Nash differential or difference games or cob-web dynamics and some 
learning adjustment process
64 since, in all these cases, our propositions can 
be directly applied to steady state relationships.   
 
                                                           
60 A notable exception, among others, is Başar et al. (1988).  
61 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2005). 
62 See Engwerda (1998) for an example. 
63 See Petit (1990) or Başar and Olsder (1995) for a complete discussion. 
64 See among others Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Sargent (2002: Chapter 3), and Di 
Bartolomeo and Pauwels (2005) as examples for cob-web dynamics or learning adjustment 
process where our results holds.   43
 
Appendix A – The linear model 
Throughout the paper we consider linear relationships among economic 
variables. In different parts of the paper we use different relations and often 
express them – in particular in sections 3 and 4 – in terms of partitioned 
matrices. This Appendix aims to clarify the relationship between the 
different representations of the economic system used.  
Consider the general linear-equation system (1) in Section 2. By using 


















uc u y ∈\  is the vector of variables contained in the Government’s 
loss function only; the vector 
wc w y ∈\  is the vector of variables 
contained in the Agent’s loss function only; 
s cs y ∈\  is the vector of 
variables contained in both loss functions. 
2. 
n u∈\  is the vector of Government’s instruments; the vector 
p w∈\  is the vector of Agent’s instruments. 
3.  u D  and  w D  are appropriate coefficient matrices.  









yD u D w K
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⎡⎤⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ ⎢⎥⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ −− = ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦⎣⎦ ⎝⎠
 i.e. A uw x Du Dw K − −= ,   44
where: 
i
u D  and 
i
w D  for  { } ,, iu s w ∈  are appropriate coefficient matrices.  
From (A2) we extract the first mgl = +  equations and by simple 









⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ + ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
  
i.e. equation (12) in Section 3. Matrix 
mm A
× ∈\  is obtained by eliminating 
from A  columns and rows from  1 m+  on. The system (13) can be derived 
from equation (A2) in a similar way by extracting the last lv +  equations. 
Moreover, notice that, by defining  :
us
uu BD D
′ ⎡ ⎤ ′ ′ =
⎣ ⎦
;  ( ) ,
us KK K A w =+  , we 
can rewrite (A3) as equation (2) in the Section 2. 
 
Appendix B – A Numerical example of sub-controllability 
Example 1. Consider the following numerical values for the general model 
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where it is easy to check that full-rank conditions are satisfied, i.e. 
()3 rank A =  and  ()2 rank B = .  The structural model (B1) can be rewritten 
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where  ()2 rank C = . Moreover,  [ ] BlockDiag C  is never equal to C; in fact 
by swapping the first with the third-target variable, system (B2) can be 
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⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ −= − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ −− − ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝ ⎠
 
According to our discussion, from system (B3), the Government can control 
the third target variable, i.e. y3. The same is evident by computing the 
column set of C directly from the more general system (B2), e.g. 
() ( )
15
0,0,1 , 6, ,0
2
col C
⎧⎫ ′ ⎪⎪ ⎛⎞ ′ =− ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
, and verifying if the eye vectors can be 
derived as linear combinations of it. For example, in order to check if the 
first-target variable, y1, is controllable, we must verify that 
() ( ) 1, 0, 0 span col C ∈ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , which is clearly untrue. By contrast, in the case of 
the third target variable, y3, ( ) ( ) 0,0,1 span col C ∈ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ is verified.  
 
Appendix C – Rational expectations and game theory 
This appendix aims to clarify the relationship between the rational 
expectation hypothesis and the policy games, in particular, between the 
former and the different concepts used to solve games. We provide a simple 
informal discussion to stress the main relationship and describe the 
terminology that is used in the paper. For a more formal description see 
Petit (1990: Chapters 8-10).    46
Assuming that an operator is interested to predicting the future (or 
unknown)
65 value of a certain variable z or a vector of variables, we refer to 
the operator’s forecast (or expectation) as  ( ) z E . The rational expectation 
hypothesis implies that  ()   E  is said rational if: 
(C1)  () zE z I E = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   
where     E I ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  is the statistical expectation conditional on informational 
available at the time the forecast is made. In other words, the rational 
expectation hypothesis requires that the prediction made by the forecaster be 
consistent with the prediction generated by the model, conditional on 
information available at the time the forecast is done. Definition (C1) 
implies: 
(C2)  () zz ε E = +  
where is ε  a purely random shock with zero mean. In a deterministic model 
() zz = E , i.e. perfect foresight.    
In models with explicit rational expectation variables as, e.g., that in Barro-
Gordon (1983), the effects and the meaning of the rational expectations is 
rather clear. Models with explicit rational expectations consider the action 
of the players constrained by the rational expectations: The traditional 
player’s problem is augmented with the additional constraint that 
expectations are rational and the structural model describing the economy 
                                                           
65 The variable can be also set at the same time the operator has to make his choices (and 
thus he needs to know the variable value), but if the operator cannot observe it, he should 
make a forecast. This situation is rare in the traditional expectation models. By contrast, it 
is rather usual in policy game, for example in Nash equilibrium, each player in setting the   47
depends also on the private sector forecast of economic variables (and thus 
of policy variables). By contrast, in policy games the strategies of the 
private sector are “simultaneously modeled” to the players’ behavior by 
implicitly considering that the private sector forms rational expectations in 
forming its strategies.
66 In policy games the relationship between the 
players’ action and the rational expectation hypothesis is more obscure. 
However, as we will show, the policy game approach is richer and more 
general and rich since it easily permits to take account of different 
information structures extending the rational expectation case.      
By considering the policy game approach, the rational expectations imply 
the operator perfectly anticipates the actions of the other players given the 
information the operator has (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995: 439) for a 
clear example). Hence the natural way to model rational expectations is the 
Nash sub-game perfect equilibrium (e.g. the Stackelberg equilibrium of two-
player static games). 
In a game between two players (U and W), which have two policy 
instruments (respectively, u and w), the time protocol associated with the 
Stackelberg equilibrium implies that the game leader (e.g. W) moves first 
without knowing the value of the instrument set by his rival (i.e. player U). 
Moreover, by definition, it is assumed that both players know the rules of 
the game and the other player’s preference. In such a situation the leader of 
                                                                                                                                                    
control variable has to make an expectation on the simultaneously-determined rival’s 
choice since he cannot observe it.  
66 Notice that here when we use the expression “simultaneously modeled” we do not mean 
that the private sector and the Government play simultaneously but only that their actions 
are modeled simultaneously, i.e. by directly considering their strategies instead of the 
Government strategies constrained by the private sector expectations on public sector 
action.    48
the game in setting u should form an expectation on the value w that the 
follower will set.  
Consider the game described by the following figure in the space of 





The reaction function of the leader (follower) W (U) is RW (RU). Gray 
(pink) lines are the follower (leader)’s indifference curves, who sets w (u). 
Point S clearly represents the Stackelberg ( , SS wu ) equilibrium of the game. 
As the leader (W) in setting her policy cannot observe the policy of the 
follower she should form an expectation on it. She conjectures  () 1 uu E =  
and, therefore, plays  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 wf u f u E == . Notice that nothing assures that 
(.) E  is rational. We just assume that for some reason  ( ) 1 uu E =  is the 
leader’s conjecture about the action of the follower. The follower (U) 
   w1 
   w2 
w 
u            u1   u2
       N 
 
    
  U=1 
 
    U=2 
 
                W=2 
        
                W=1 
 
        
          S  
       0 
  RU 
     RW 
  RU 
    RW   49
observes  1 w  and plays  1 u , which is optimal for him. Hence the Stackelberg 
equilibrium is represented by point S, where  1 S ww =  and  1 S uu = . In 
equilibrium leader conjecture on the rival’s behavior is realized.
67 Hence 
Stackelberg equilibrium is supported by self-confirming beliefs 
( () 1 S uuu E ==), in such a sense it can be seen as the outcome of the 
rational expectation hypothesis (see equation (B2)). In other words, operator 
()   E  is a rational expectation.  
Now consider the Nash equilibrium N. The time protocol associated with it 
implies that each player moves without knowing the value of the instrument 
set by his rival. Moreover, as in the previous case, we assume that both 
players know the rules of the game and the other player’s preference. In 
such a situation both players in setting their instruments should form 
expectations on the other player’s policy. 
As in the Stackelberg case, when W sets w, she cannot observe u and has to 
make a conjecture (expectation), i.e.  ( ) 1 uu E = . Simultaneously, U makes a 
conjecture that W will play w2, i.e.  ( ) 2 ww E = . In equilibrium,  2 N ww =  and 
2 N uu = , but this means that expectations are fulfilled:  ( ) N uu E =  and 
() N ww E = .  
Thus Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as the result of a situation in 
which both players form rational (conjectures) expectations on the other 
player’s policy since in equilibrium each player conjecture on the rival’s 
behavior is realized. In other word Nash equilibrium is supported by self-
                                                           
67 Notice that U does not form expectations since she observes the value of w.   50
confirming beliefs and can be seen as the outcome of the rational 
expectation assumption. 
 
Appendix D – Nash equilibrium existence and controllability 
Recall that, if the systems (19) and (20) are TT-controllable, C  and C   are 
square matrices. By solving problem (16), we derive the following first 
order conditions: 
(D1)  ( ) ''' 0 CQ C u CQ E w CQ y F +−+ =  




CQ y CQ F CQ C CQ E u
CN E CN C w CN z CN F
+ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎛ ⎞
= ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦      . A necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a solution is that the inverse of 
''
''
CQ C CQ E
CN E CN C
⎡⎤
∆=⎢⎥
⎣⎦     exists. The inverse existence requires that  ' CQ C, 
' CN C  , ()
11 I CE CE
−− −   , and ( )
11 I CE CE
−− −    are non singular. 
It is easy to verify that if the players share all the target variables the inverse 
of matrix ∆ does not exist, since, in such a case, CE =   and EC =  . More 
in detail,  () ( )
11 11 ss ss
uw wu CE CE D D D D I
−− −− ==   . Moreover, notice that for 
CE =   and E C =  , the first order condition can be rewritten as 
( ) ( )
11 1 0 EC C y F E z F
−− − =− − + − , which is clearly satisfied only for 
yz = . In other words, even if a solution in the space of controls does not   51
exists, for  yz =  a trivial solution in the space of target exists such that 
x yz ==.  
More in general, matrix ∆ can be rewritten as the product of two square 





∅ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
∆= =Γ∆ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ′ ∅ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦   , where 
g llv +×+ ∅∈\  
is a zero rectangular matrix. Clearly,  ( ) 1 det 0 Γ = . Hence ∆ is singular. 
Notice that if the two systems are not TT-controllable by decision-makers 
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